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Using the politicized institutional analysis and development framework to
analyze (adaptive) comanagement: farming and water resources in England
Luke Whaley 1 and Edward K. Weatherhead 2
ABSTRACT. The challenge of managing water resources in England is becoming increasingly complex and uncertain, a situation
reflected in many countries around the world. Cooperative and participatory forms of governance are now seen as one way of addressing
this challenge. We investigated this assertion by focusing on five farmer irrigator groups in the low-lying east of England. The groups’
relationship with water resources management was interpreted through the lens of comanagement, which over the past decade has
increasingly merged with the field of adaptive management and related concepts that derive from resilience thinking and complex
adaptive systems theory. Working within a critical realist paradigm, our analysis was guided by the politicized institutional analysis
and development (IAD) framework. Two previous studies concerned with the broader context surrounding farming and water
governance in lowland England revealed low levels of trust between farmers, and between farmers and water managers, as well as a
power dynamic that stands in the way of farmer cooperation and participation. Within this context, our findings pointed to a number
of mechanisms and structural conditions that appear to generate or facilitate comanagement. Of these, institution building through
the specific group strategy of adopting a company structure and the “stationarity” of the resource group members extract from were
seen to be the most crucial. These and other key findings were used to inform a discussion of farming and water resources management
in England going forward. In doing so, we also reflected on the relationship between comanagement and market-based approaches to
managing water resources. Beyond this, the research serves as a practical demonstration of how the politicized IAD framework can be
used to analyze potential (adaptive) comanagement situations and the related benefits. The analysis complements a previous submission
to this journal, in which we discussed the relationship between the framework and (adaptive) comanagement from a theoretical and
methodological perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
As a concept, comanagement provides a useful lens through which
to interpret cooperation and participation in natural resource
governance. Not least, it draws attention to key features of the
process of developing joint management procedures, including
trust, power sharing, and institution building (Pinkerton 1989a,
Plummer and Armitage 2007, Berkes 2009). The adaptive turn in
comanagement has provided further advances and has deepened
our understanding of human–environment relations through its
focus on concepts, such as social learning, and its appreciation of
the inherent complexity and uncertainty of coupled social-
ecological systems (Folke et al. 2005, Plummer and Fitzgibbon
2007, Armitage et al. 2009). These developments have shone the
spotlight on comanagement as a way of enhancing system
resilience and adaptive capacity if  it evolves to become adaptive
comanagement (Folke 2003, Olsson et al. 2004a, Moberg and
Galaz 2005, Armitage et al. 2007), traits that will only become
more important as the effects of climate change, a shifting
demography, and changing lifestyle preferences continue to
challenge the sustainability of natural resource governance
(United Nations Environment Programme 2012). (Note: Our use
of the term “comanagement” encompasses the concept as
originally conceived and its adaptive counterpart, i.e., “adaptive
comanagement,” in which the latter is seen to be an evolutionary
development of the former [Berkes 2009]).  
However, despite the contributions that the field of
comanagement has made to environmental and natural resource
governance, some aspects of the concept remain less well
explored. In particular, comanagement research has tended to
focus on developing-country contexts or on indigenous
communities attempting to secure more substantive property
rights claims to natural resources in developed countries. Far
fewer studies have explored comanagement in situations in which
the actors involved are economically driven and strongly
embedded in capitalist systems of production. Furthermore,
despite theoretical discussions in the literature (Rose 2002,
Tietenberg 2002), very few studies have concerned themselves
with the relationship between comanagement and market-based
forms of natural resource management.  
Beyond these considerations, two methodological issues tend to
challenge analyses of comanagement (Whaley and Weatherhead
2014). The first concerns the cross-disciplinary nature of the
subject, in which comanagement’s traditional social base in
commons theory and related fields has in more recent times been
complemented by resilience thinking, which has its roots in the
natural sciences. The second and perhaps more significant issue
relates to the fact that the vast majority of comanagement
research focuses on and works toward the development of the
normative concepts associated with the subject. In contrast to
this, far fewer studies adopt critical forms of analysis to investigate
these concepts. With respect to work on social resilience and
natural resource management, Wilson (2010) observes that those
studies that do adopt a critical approach tend not to exhibit the
same rigor as studies that proceed along more normative lines.  
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We offer a contribution to these relatively underdeveloped aspects
of comanagement theory and method. We address the theoretical
considerations through an analysis of farmer irrigator groups,
known as “water abstractor groups,” in England. We explore the
potential for these collaborations to comanage water resources in
conjunction with statutory water managers by identifying key
“factors of success” and deeper causal “mechanisms” that appear
to generate comanagement. The research comes at a time when the
UK government is looking to instigate a more fluid system of water
rights trading in England. This provides an opportunity to consider
the contribution of abstractor groups to the comanagement of
water resources within a market-based context. To guide our
analysis, we have adopted a version of the institutional analysis and
development (IAD) framework, originally developed by Elinor
Ostrom and her colleagues (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, Ostrom 2005,
2011) but that has been modified by Clement (2010) to incorporate
a critical consideration of the role of power in natural resource
governance. In an earlier study published in this journal (Whaley
and Weatherhead 2014), we discussed the suitability of applying
this framework to studies of (adaptive) comanagement because of
the way in which it is able to address the methodological issues
outlined previously. In particular, the politicized IAD framework
facilitates a structured and consistent approach to analyzing the
“many faces of comanagement” (Berkes 2007, 2009), while
advocating for a range of analytical methods designed to provide
an integrated and critical understanding of the normative concepts
associated with comanagement theory.  
We therefore provide an opportunity to move beyond our initial
theoretical discussion of the relationship between (adaptive)
comanagement and the politicized IAD framework and to
demonstrate its applicability from a practical perspective. Our
analysis represents the culmination of a research program
investigating farmer cooperation and participation in English water
governance, which centers on the adoption of the politicized IAD
framework. Therefore, the analysis also provides insights into issues
currently affecting water management in England. Moreover, it is
likely that our findings are of relevance to those attempting to
establish comanagement processes in other developed-country
contexts with similar conditions.
WATER ABSTRACTOR GROUPS IN ENGLAND
Unlike many other countries, where agriculture is often the
dominant water use, in England irrigation only accounts for
approximately 1.5% of the total volume of water abstracted
annually. It is used to supply high-value crops on a land area of
roughly 150,000 ha (Woods 2000, Weatherhead 2006). Nonetheless,
in agriculturally intensive regions like the low-lying eastern counties
of East Anglia and Lincolnshire, irrigation can account for up to
70% of water abstracted in some catchments during the summer
months (Holman and Trawick 2011).  
In these areas, pressure on water resources from agriculture and
other uses can sometimes be intense. Confounding this issue, studies
by the Environment Agency (EA), the regulating body in charge of
managing England’s water environment, suggest that water
resources across England will become more stressed in the future
as a result of “a growing population, increasing demand for water
and a changing climate,” and that this will result in less water for
agriculture (EA 2013:8). For example, an EA report notes that
climate change is “likely to alter the water cycle [in England]
significantly in the future. The amount and distribution of rainfall
will change … This will affect water availability to support water
dependent species and habitats and the availability of water for
society and economic growth” (EA 2012:19). The government’s
response to these challenges has been to consult on changes to the
water licensing system, with a focus on reforming it so as to
introduce a more fluid system of water rights trading. Although
water license trading is technically possible in England and Wales,
to date very few trades have taken place because of a number of
barriers, among them perceived institutional shortcomings (EA/
Ofwat 2008a).  
In reaction to developments in water and environmental regulation
that placed new boundaries on water use in agriculture, since the
1990s a number of farmer water abstractor groups have formed,
with the general aim of defending their rights to access a “fair share
of water.” Over time, however, it has become clear that acting
collectively brings additional benefits, both to the members of the
group and to the government. Leathes et al. (2008) discuss the
institutional capacity of four of these groups to defend their rights
to abstract water for irrigation. Beyond this rather insular function,
the authors also ask whether there is a role for abstractor groups
in water management more generally. The role of abstractor groups
in water management is also a question that has not escaped the
attention of the EA, which, for example, finds it easier to deal with
a coherent group than with numerous individuals (Knox et al. [date
unknown]).  
The comanagement literature suggests that one area of interest
could be the role of abstractor groups in any future water market.
They might act much like a trading broker by lowering transaction
costs between potential buyers and sellers. Thus, Rose (2002) has
considered how communities and user groups could become
liberalized by employing a tradable permits approach, as a way of
allocating natural resources among themselves. This observation is
supported by Tietenberg (2002), who discusses how common pool
resources such as water are actually well suited to market-oriented
comanagement arrangements.  
Although at present only a small number of abstractor groups exist,
the likelihood that access to water will become more variable and
less secure in the future (EA 2012) suggests that further groups will
form in response to a growing number of challenges to irrigated
agriculture, particularly in those catchments where water is scarce.
This point reinforces the need to understand how these groups may
play a role in water resources management in the future.
METHODOLOGY
The research is situated within a critical realist paradigm (Bhaskar
1975, 1979, Archer et al. 1998). Broadly speaking, critical realism
combines a realist ontology with an interpretivist epistemology
(Easton 2010). From this perspective, although a world, both
physical and social, exists independently of the minds of humans,
knowledge of this reality “is filtered through language and concepts
that are relative and changeable in time and space” (Danermark et
al. 2002:39). Furthermore, reality has ontological depth (Bhaskar
1975). That is, the events we witness in the world are generated by
structures and mechanisms operating at a deeper ontological level,
and so it is often not possible to observe them directly. Thus, for
the realist researcher, the central aim of science is to identify the
mechanisms that generate observable events or outcomes of interest
within a given context (Danermark et al. 2002). We will discuss this
search for mechanisms subsequently.  
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We adopted an embedded multiple case study approach (Yin
2009) to analyze the structure and function of 5 farmer water
abstractor groups in England. The research employed the
politicized IAD framework (Clement 2010, Whaley and
Weatherhead 2014) to guide the various strands of the analysis,
in which in total data were sourced from 25 semistructured
interviews with farmers and governmental and nongovernmental
water managers; 2 focus groups with farmers in catchments to the
east and west of the country; an analysis of primary and
secondary documents relating to water policy and the
development of farming and water management dating from
World War II until the present day; and a literature review. We
incorporate and build on the findings from 2 separate analyses
(Whaley and Weatherhead 2015a, 2015b), as described
subsequently.
Five case studies
The 5 water abstractor groups we analyzed are located in the low-
lying, and generally drier, east of England (Fig. 1). Our intention
was to include the same 4 groups previously analyzed by Leathes
et al. (2008). After contacting representatives from each of these
groups, we found one of them, the North Northumbrian Water
Abstractor Group, was no longer fully operational. The
remaining 3 are the Broadlands Agricultural Water Abstractor
Group (BAWAG), which formed in 1997 and comprises roughly
180 farmer members and 20-30 corporate members; East Suffolk
Water Abstractor Group (ESWAG), which consists of
approximately 80 members and which also formed in 1997; and
Lincoln Water Transfer Limited (LWT), which officially formed
sometime during the late 1990s.
Fig. 1. Map of England and Wales showing location of the five
water abstractor groups included in the study. Blue shading
represents areas under the management of internal drainage
boards. Adapted from Venables et al. [date unknown]. BAWAG,
Broadlands Agricultural Water Abstractor Group; ESWAG,
East Suffolk Water Abstractor Group; LWT, Lincoln Water
Transfer.
LWT initially consisted of 19 members but over time has been
reduced to 14 as several members have left and new members have
joined. An initial scoping exercise of all the case studies revealed
that LWT appears to be somewhat different from the other groups
with respect to its involvement in water resources comanagement.
As will become apparent subsequently, LWT served as an
“extreme case study,” allowing us to explore certain factors that
give rise to comanagement in its “purer” form (Danermark et al.
2002).  
Alongside these 3 groups, i.e., BAWAG, ESWAG, and LWT, we
included 2 more. These are the Lark group, which is the oldest
abstractor group in England, having formed in 1991 and
consisting of roughly 80 members, of which approximately 50
hold significant water licenses; and the Nar group, a nascent
organization comprising roughly 30 farm businesses that formed
on the River Nar during 2011. These 5 groups account for the
vast majority, if  not all, of the active water abstractor groups in
England (Knox et al. [date unknown]).
Applying the politicized institutional analysis and development
framework
We analyzed the structure and function of the five water
abstractor groups and their contribution to seven broad
comanagement activities (Table 1) using the politicized IAD
framework (Fig. 2). The comanagement activities are adopted
from Pinkerton (1989b). Our approach to employing the
framework follows the process detailed in Whaley and
Weatherhead (2014), which allowed us to critically analyze
normative comanagement concepts within the context of the
specific case histories of the five abstractor groups. The following
steps summarize this process: (1) define the relevant action
situations; (2) analyze the components of each action situation,
including outcomes; (3) analyze the shared strategies that
individuals and groups adopted within the actions situations; (4)
evaluate interactions and outcomes; (5) investigate the five sets of
exogenous variables and analyze the ways in which they structure
the action situations; (6) infer generative mechanisms and
structural conditions from the relevant factors identified in the
previous step; and (7) consider future interactions and outcomes
given certain changes to the structure of action situations.




1 Data gathering and analysis
2 Logistical decisions such as who can abstract water and when
3 Water allocation decisions
4 Protection of resource from environmental damage
5 Enforcement of regulations
6 Enhancement and long-term planning
7 Broad policy decision making
 
With respect to step 1, an “action situation” relates to the social
space “where individuals interact, exchange goods and services,
solve problems, dominate one another, and fight (among the many
things that individuals do in action situations)” (Ostrom 2011:11).
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Actions situations are composed of seven working components
(Fig. 3), where there are “participants” who take up various
“positions,” and where any given position allows the participants
to undertake certain “actions” that are dependent on how much
“information” they possess about each available action, how
actions are linked to “potential outcomes,” the degree of
“control” individuals exercise over these outcomes, and the “costs
and benefits” they assign to them (Ostrom 1990). For each of the
five groups, the action situations we identified pertained both to
different levels of governance, such as operational and collective-
choice levels, and organization, such as interorganizational and
intragroup dynamics.
Fig. 2. The politicized institutional analysis and development
framework, with the two variables that have been analyzed in
separate studies shaded in gray. Adapted from Clement (2010).
Fig. 3. The action situation of the institutional analysis and
development framework. Adapted from Ostrom (2005).
With respect to step 5, we considered how the five sets of
exogenous variables structure both the broader context in which
all five groups are operating, where this relates to a geographic
region encompassing the low-lying areas of southern and eastern
England, and each of the various action situations pertaining to
the different case studies, i.e., local structural conditions. The
forms of the analyses we undertook for each set of variables, as
well as the focus of these analyses, were guided by the relationship
between the sets of exogenous variables and the seven components
of the action situation in question. For example, the discourse
element of the framework most directly influences the position
component of the action situation (Clement 2010). This led us to
consider positioning theory as a relevant approach when
analyzing the discourse of the farmers in the study. Alternatively,
the rules element of the framework directly affects all seven
components of the action situation (Ostrom 2005), and our
analysis therefore sought to identify relevant rules that accorded
with the seven categories of rules that stem from this relationship,
namely, boundary, position, choice, aggregation, information,
payoff, and scope rules (Ostrom 2005).  
Considering the broader context, two of the sets of exogenous
variables of the politicized IAD framework, relating to the
“political-economic” and “discourse” elements (see Fig. 2), were
analyzed in separate studies. In the first study (Whaley and
Weatherhead 2015b), we employed a political economy analysis
of farming and water governance in England for a time period
dating from World War II until the present day. The research was
based on an analysis of government documents and other primary
texts and an extensive review of secondary sources. We adopted
an approach known as the “power cube” (Gaventa 2005, 2006),
which explicitly structures the analysis of power along the three
dimensions of a theoretical cube. These dimensions consist of the
following: (1) the different forms that power takes, i.e., visible,
hidden, and invisible (sensu Lukes 1974); (2) the types of spaces
that power creates and operates within, i.e., closed, invited, and
claimed; and (3) the levels at which power operates, e.g., local,
national, and international. Doing so revealed how different
forms of power, operating in different types of spaces and at
different levels of governance, have come to shape the current
dynamic among farmers, as well as between farmers and water
managers, in England.  
In the second study (Whaley and Weatherhead 2015a), we
investigated the discourse element of the framework by employing
2 concepts from critical discursive psychology (Edley 2001) to
analyze the ways in which irrigators in England talk about water
management, water managers, and the water environment. Data
consisted of 20 interviews and 2 focus groups, in which
interviewees were members of water abstractor groups, whereas
the focus groups comprised farmers from 2 separate catchments
who were considering forming an abstractor group. The 2
analytical concepts we utilized were interpretive repertoires and
subject positions.  
An interpretive repertoire shares much in common with the more
well-known concept of a discourse but is generally seen to be
smaller and less overbearing. In effect, interpretive repertoires are
ensembles of ideas, categories, and concepts “used for
characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other
phenomena,” in which “often a repertoire will be organized
around specific metaphors and figures of speech” (Potter and
Wetherell 1987:149). Subject positions refer to the positions
people negotiate and assign to themselves and others during the
course of social interaction (Davies and Harré 1990, Harré et al.
2009). Interpretive repertoires can therefore be thought of as
different story lines or versions of events, and it is within these
story lines that agents are positioned. To this extent, interpretive
repertoires and subject positions are bound up with the
negotiation of power, as some repertoires become dominant and
solidify into distinct institutional structures and organizational
practices (Hajer 1995). In the second study, the subject positions
of interest relate to farmers and the various actors involved in
water governance, as well as the water environment itself.  
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Variables relating to the political-economic and discourse
categories of the framework most directly affect the position
element of the action situation (Fig. 3). They also shape the values,
norms, and preferences of participants in these situations (see
Whaley and Weatherhead 2014). As a result, the findings from
these two studies have a strong bearing on the behavior of
participants in the action situations of interest. Both analyses
served to highlight how context, power, and levels of trust
fundamentally influence the ability of farmers to comanage water
resources in England. A discussion of the findings of each study
is provided in Results.  
As noted previously, in keeping with a critical realist approach
(Bhaskar 1975, 1979, Sayer 1992, Danermark et al. 2002) a core
concern of the research was to identify the deeper causal
mechanisms that generate comanagement arrangements between
abstractor groups and water managers. It is important to note
that the effects of these mechanisms are contextual (Sayer 1992)
in that their operation can only be understood in light of both
the broader and more local structural conditions we identified
when investigating the politicized IAD framework’s five sets of
exogenous variables. As our results show, LWT proved to be the
only case in which a true comanagement arrangement has
emerged. It therefore served as an extreme case study (Danermark
et al. 2002), in which we used the politicized IAD framework to
identify factors of success that appeared to link the LWT group
to a comanagement outcome and from which we then made
inferences about what these factors suggest either about the
presence of local structural conditions or generative mechanisms
operating at a deeper, more conceptual level (see Bhaskar 1975).
By way of illustration, well-known causal mechanisms in the
social sciences literature include the market mechanism, class, and
peer group influence. In the comanagement literature, examples
of mechanisms might include social learning, problem solving,
and trust.  
The explanatory power of the structures and mechanisms we
identified in the LWT case was decided on by employing two
approaches suggested by Danermark et al. (2002), namely,
counterfactual thinking and comparative case study approaches.
The interactions and outcomes of each case study were evaluated
using three related transaction costs, namely, information,
organizational, and strategic costs (Imperial 1999). We also
evaluated the ways in which the cases did or did not contribute
to the overall adaptability, efficiency, and equity of water
management, as outlined in Ostrom (2005).  
Following the analysis, we considered the implications of our
findings for water resources management in England going
forward. This involved making assumptions about likely changes
to several of the exogenous variables of the politicized IAD
framework, and thus the context of water management, in the
future. Given the complexity of natural resource management,
and of social science work more generally, it is not possible to
make strong predictions as to future interactions and outcomes.
However, as Polski and Ostrom (1999:24-25) note: “When
examining these more open, less constrained situations, a policy
analyst is forced to make weaker inferences about patterns of
interaction. However, well-informed weak inferences can still
provide important policy information.” The IAD framework is a
powerful tool for making well-informed inferences about the
behavior of a system because of the integrated, comprehensive,
and context-specific approach it encourages the analyst to adopt
(Whaley and Weatherhead 2014).
RESULTS
First, we provide an overview of the findings of our investigation
into the five sets of exogenous variables of the politicized IAD
framework as they apply generally to all five case studies. These
insights serve to identify relevant aspects of the broader structural
conditions within which all five groups currently operate. We
summarize the main findings from the the political-economic and
discourse analyses, explored in the two previous studies (Whaley
and Weatherhead 2015a, 2015b), before considering the
remaining three sets of exogenous variables, namely, the
biophysical-material world, rules, and the community.
Findings of the political-economic and discourse analyses
The political economy analysis revealed that the system of
industrial agriculture that developed after World War II in
England resulted in an occupational identity for lowland farmers
that revolves around individualism, competition, and a desire to
maximize profit and production, often at the expense of the
environment. In part, this sense of identity, or power “within”
(VeneKlasen and Miller 2002), appears to have been maintained
by the corporate agricultural supply chain and the structure of
the global food system, which exert considerable downward
pressure on farmers.  
Alongside this, two other key findings can be distilled from the
analysis. First, despite structural moves in England toward more
participatory, cross-scale forms of water governance, government
agencies such as the EA continue to exercise power over farmers
and other nonstate actors instead of sharing power with them.
Second, the relationship between farming and environmental
interests is one founded on conflict and dispute and is
characterized by a lack of trust. These findings suggest that
notions of participation, cooperation, and wider environmental
concern are marginal considerations for many farmers in England
today, especially in the low-lying east of the country where large-
scale, mechanized farming dominates (Holderness 1985, Marsden
et al. 1993).  
The political economy analysis also charted the rise of water
abstractor groups, which, as mentioned previously, started to
form in the 1990s to defend their rights to abstract water. At the
same time, legislation emanating from Europe, influenced by
international conferences and conventions, has resulted in greater
opportunity for farmers to participate in water management at
the local catchment and subcatchment levels. This suggests that
there is space for water abstractor groups to undertake a more
proactive management role, despite their reactive beginnings.
However, the analysis highlighted the difficulty of achieving such
an outcome given the barriers identified previously.  
The discourse analysis identified three different interpretive
repertoires, namely, the “competition,” “conflict,” and
“compromise” repertoires. The competition repertoire was the
most dominant of the three, whereas the compromise repertoire
was by far the least dominant. The competition repertoire
embraces strong business values and takes a utilitarian approach
to the water environment. According to this repertoire, farmer
cooperation and participation in water governance is only
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considered of any use if  it makes sense from an individual business
perspective. The conflict repertoire, which is “founded on a logic
of opposition and stresses the place of conflict and difference in
water resources management,” serves to largely obstruct the
comanagement process (Whaley and Weatherhead 2015a:808).  
On the other hand, the less prominent compromise repertoire
provides more scope for farmer cooperation and participation in
water governance. This is because it recognizes the value of the
wider water environment and views water resources management
as “a process of balancing the various needs of the stakeholders
who use water” (Whaley and Weatherhead 2015a:811). The
analysis highlighted the importance of improving communication
between farmers, and between farmers and water managers, to
move beyond the competition and conflict repertoires and to
instead nurture a more widespread adoption of the compromise
repertoire.  
As noted in Methodology, each interpretive repertoire has a
number of subject positions associated with it that relate to the
various actors involved in water governance. One outcome
concerning the dominance of the competition and conflict
repertoires is attributed to the subject positions both repertoires
provide for governmental and nongovernmental water managers,
which suggest that relationships between farmers and water
managers are characterized in large part by a distinct lack of trust.
Because of the importance comanagement places on the
development of trust (Olsson et al. 2004a, Folke et al. 2005,
Plummer 2006), this represents a significant challenge to
partnership building.  
Given the findings of the political economy and discourse
analyses, we conclude that the dominant norms of the farmers
are likely to be those of competition, business operating
procedures, conflict, and nonparticipation, and the values they
place on water management outcomes will tend to revolve mostly
around profit and business independence, success, and
professionalism. On the whole, the findings of these two studies
would appear to act as a distinct barrier to the emergence of
comanagement between abstractor groups and water managers
in England.
Biophysical-material, rules, and community variables
Considering first the biophysical-material element of the
framework, a common feature of many catchments with a high
proportion of irrigation licenses is the presence of on-farm
reservoirs. The biophysical-material world affects what actions
are physically possible in an action situation, what outcomes can
be produced, how actions are linked to outcomes, and what is
contained in participants’ information sets (Ostrom 2005).
Therefore, having a degree of storage in the system in the form of
reservoirs has the potential to significantly affect the internal
dynamic of the action situation and the incentives participants
face. In the discussion, we will consider the role of on-farm
reservoirs in agricultural water management going forward.  
Given that England is a country with strongly enforced formal
institutions, we have taken the government regulations relating to
water management as de facto conditions that participants
operate under within the action situations at which we looked.
Many of the rules that are of particular relevance relate to the
government’s water abstraction regime, which is enforced by the
EA; see Ostrom (2005:188-215) for a discussion of the types of
rules that structure an action situation. In particular, there is a
boundary rule stating that anybody intending to abstract >20 m³
of water a day must first obtain a license. The license itself
contains scope rules detailing how much water a person or
business can take, what they can use the water for, where and when
they can abstract water, and any minimum flow or level
limitations. Breaches of the license conditions may result in
financial losses to farmers if  they are claimants of the various
subsidies available through the EU’s Common Agricultural
Policy, in which a proportion of the amount normally received
can be withheld as a penalty. Continued license transgressions can
result in the EA taking legal action through the courts.  
Other rules relating to water resources management include
section 57 of the Water Resources Act 1991, which states that
during periods of water scarcity the EA has the power to halt
water abstraction for the purpose of spray irrigation.
Furthermore, there are rules allowing abstractors to trade their
licenses with one another on a water body, although to date few
trades have taken place. In part, this is because of a lack of
understanding of how to trade and the time-consuming nature
of the process (EA/Ofwat 2008b). However, as we noted
previously, now it is the intention of the government to
operationalize a more enhanced system of water license trading
in England.  
Finally, with respect to the community element of the framework,
the vast majority of farmers we interviewed were white males
between the ages of 40 and 65. This is unsurprising given that
farmers in the United Kingdom are predominantly male, with an
average age of 59 (DEFRA 2012).  
Having considered the results of our analyses of the broader
context according to the politicized IAD framework’s five sets of
exogenous variables, we discuss the findings from the analyses of
the five case studies. As already noted, of these groups, LWT
differs substantively from the others in terms of its involvement
in the comanagement of water resources. Because of this, we have
combined the discussion of the remaining four groups and follow
with a more detailed consideration of LWT. However, we shall
return to consider all five groups together when identifying the
explanatory power of the different mechanisms and key structural
conditions that appear to generate or facilitate the development
of comanagement in the LWT case.
Analysis of four farmer irrigator groups
Our analysis confirmed the findings of our initial scoping exercise,
namely, that BAWAG, ESWAG, Lark, and Nar abstractor groups
contributed relatively little from a comanagement perspective
(Fig. 4). Instead, to differing degrees, the central function of these
groups is to lobby for farmers’ rights to access water. However,
despite their lobby focus, it has been noticeable that over time the
groups have developed more proactive tendencies. Perhaps the
most notable contribution of these groups to water resources
comanagement is a shared strategy, adopted by several of them,
to volunteer a reduction in their water use during periods of water
scarcity. This strategy appears to have been adopted to avoid a
section 57 order, as discussed previously, rather than out of any
altruistic impulse on behalf  of farmers to improve the water
resources situation in the catchment as a whole.
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Fig. 4. The combined contribution of the water abstractor
groups, i.e., Lark, Broadlands Agricultural Water Abstractor
Group, East Suffolk Water Abstractor Group, and Nar, to
Pinkerton’s seven comanagement activities.
We also observed evidence of groups encouraging water efficiency
measures among their membership, conducting resource
monitoring, representing farmers in conferences and meetings
dealing with broader water policy issues, and commissioning
studies to assess resource conditions in some catchments and the
value of irrigable agriculture to the local economy. Again, these
measures have been adopted largely to improve the groups’ ability
to effectively lobby for farmers’ rights and to increase the benefits
they gain from irrigation. This behavior is in keeping with our
findings from the political economy and discourse analyses,
which, as discussed previously, would suggest that the farmers
would tend to act in ways that benefit their own individual
(business) interests. There is also evidence that at least two of the
groups were facilitating water trading between members, either
through advertising of spare water in their periodic newsletters
or through face-to-face communication between members at
meetings.  
An analysis of the information component of the action situation
revealed that group members held varying degrees of local time-
and-place knowledge, which may contribute to water
management decision making. This related to an understanding
of the distribution of interests and resources within the
catchment, local knowledge of the resource and its history,
current and future water requirements, and future business
practices that may have an impact on the resource. In contrast,
the knowledge held by the regulatory agencies stemmed from a
scientific approach to managing water and focused on a better
appreciation of the bigger picture of water governance in
England. Although staff  in these agencies also held a degree of
local knowledge, over time this knowledge base has eroded as staff
members have retired or have moved on in the many waves of
government reorganization.  
EA officers also held detailed knowledge about water and
environmental regulation, as well as recent or upcoming changes
to these regulations. Interestingly, in each case the leader of the
abstractor group also held this information to a large degree. In
two of the groups, there was a choice rule (again, see Ostrom
[2005], for a discussion on the types of rules and their relationship
to the action situation of the IAD framework) instructing the
leader of the group to remain up-to-date with water legislation
and to attend meetings and conferences when necessary. In both
these cases, this individual received a salary from the group,
primarily to perform this function.  
Considering the costs and benefits of abstractor groups from a
transaction costs perspective, it is clear that the biggest benefit to
water governance has been a reduction in information costs. This
is a direct result of enhanced communication channels between
farmers, and between farmers and water managers. On the other
hand, coordination costs have tended to increase for the farmers
involved, particularly in the early stages of group formation. This
increase in coordination costs is significant in light of the findings
from the political-economic analysis, whereby the prevailing
power dynamic serves as a barrier to farmer cooperation and
participation in water governance because of demands on time
and a central concern with costs and profit. Although we
discovered little hard evidence to suggest it occurs, the formation
of an abstractor group in a catchment opens the door for a number
of strategic costs. These costs relate to the ability of nonmembers
in the catchment to free ride on the group’s achievements and the
potential for groups, or even specific individuals within the
groups, to exert power over other participants to achieve purely
selfish ends. Given that the four groups in question offer only a
minimal contribution to the comanagement activities in Table 1,
we do not discuss their relationship to the more general evaluative
criteria of adaptability, efficiency, and equity.
The case of Lincoln Water Transfer Limited
In contrast to the other four water abstractor groups, the LWT
group is a clear example of a case in which farmers have self-
organized to comanage water resources. Given the generally low
levels of trust between participants and the way in which the
current power dynamic in England stands in the way of farmer
cooperation and participation in water governance, this case
represents a notable exception. As a result, it is of much interest
to identify the key factors that link the farmers to a comanagement
outcome and the causal mechanisms and structural conditions
that can be inferred from these factors of success. Before
discussing our findings, we provide a brief  overview of the
comanagement scheme in which LWT participates.
The Lincoln Water Transfer Limited scheme
The area where the LWT group operates is characterized by a
network of drainage ditches from which the members are able to
abstract water for irrigation during the growing season. These
ditches represent a “ponded” system inasmuch as the water in
them tends to stand relatively still, making it significantly easier
to manage water levels. The interconnection of the ditches also
means that water can be withdrawn at any point in the system.
The ditches drain into the oldest canal in England, the Fossdyke
Canal, which connects the River Trent with the River Witham.
The drainage ditches are managed by an internal drainage board
(IDB), which is a body with the jurisdiction to manage water levels
in certain low-lying areas of England that are most at risk from
flooding; see Fig. 1 for areas where the IDBs operate. The LWT
group, which is currently composed of 14 farm businesses
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Table 2. Nine factors contributing to the success of the Lincoln Water Transfer Limited (LWT) comanagement scheme and the structural
conditions and generative mechanisms derived from them; displayed in relation to the five sets of exogenous variables of the politicized








Present in Other Cases?
ESWAG† BAWAG† Lark Nar
Rules Formation of limited company - Bonding Yes Yes No No




No No No No
Rules Shared license - Bonding No No No No
Biophysical-
material
Ponded system of drainage
channels
Stationarity - No No No No
Biophysical-
material
Access to additional water - Bonding No No No Yes
Community Similar race, age, gender, and
profession of group members
Homogeneity - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community Small group size Group size - No No Yes Yes
Community Presence of a leader - Bonding and
bridging





- Bridging No No No No
Discourse Greater use of "compromise
repertoire"
- Trust No No No Yes
† BAWAG, Broadlands Agricultural Water Abstractor Group; ESWAG, East Suffolk Water Abstractor Group; IDB, internal drainage board.
(originally 19), formally came together in the late 1990s after years
of attempting to secure additional water for irrigation. A window
of opportunity arose when improvements were made to the
capacity of a water transfer scheme, i.e., the “Trent-within-
Ancholme (TWA) scheme,” which carried water from the River
Trent via the Fossdyke Canal to supply a town farther downstream
of the River Witham. With the upgrade to the TWA scheme, it
was possible for the group of farmers to request some of this
additional capacity being supplied from the Fossdyke Canal to
service their own irrigation needs.  
The LWT group shares a single abstraction license, which it
initially divided up among its members according to predicted
water demand. Some or all of each member’s license share can
then be reallocated within the group either before or during the
growing season, as circumstances dictate. Although submissions
of unwanted water by members into a central pool, and requests
by members to take water from this pool, are managed by the
IDB, the group’s board of directors has final say on how the water
is allocated. This is important in situations in which demand for
water from the central pool outstrips supply. In these situations,
it appears the board would employ a pro rata approach, in which
water is allocated to members requesting additional water in
accordance with their overall license share. The group also holds
a second shared license. This license allows it to apply for
additional water under the TWA scheme when water levels in the
network of drainage ditches fall too low to allow for irrigation.  
The LWT scheme entails a close working relationship between
the abstractor group and the IDB, which has taken on the
responsibility of administering the system on behalf  of the group,
as well as the EA, which is in charge of transferring additional
water under the TWA scheme. In order that the IDB can manage
water levels accurately, LWT members are required to provide
weekly returns detailing their water use in the previous week and
an estimation of their water use for the coming week. Over time,
the function of the group has evolved. Of particular note, LWT
has funded its own program to eliminate the potato brown rot
virus, Ralstonia solanacearum, from the watercourses where it
abstracts. The status of the group has also meant that its leader
is invited to attend meetings, conferences, and workshops relating
to water resources management and policy direction in England.
Our assessment of the overall contribution that the LWT scheme
makes to water resources management is shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. The relative contribution of the Lincoln Water Transfer
Limited scheme to Pinkerton’s seven comanagement activities.
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Factors of success, local conditions, and generative mechanisms
Using the politicized IAD framework (Fig. 2), we were able to
identify a range of factors that appear important to the success
of the LWT scheme. We consider these factors of success in
relation to the scheme’s formation, operation, and evolution.
Table 2 displays the various factors, which have been categorized
according to their relationship to the exogenous variables of the
politicized IAD framework, and whether they were present or
absent in the other four case studies. Table 2 also displays whether
the factors relate to local structural conditions or whether they
imply the activity of causal mechanisms. As discussed in
Methodology, by using counterfactual thinking, and by
comparing whether these factors of success were present in the
other case studies, we were able to more specifically identify those
structures and mechanisms that appear to have the most
explanatory power.  
With one exception, the names of the mechanisms we identify are
derived from the comanagement and adaptive comanagement
literature. For example, Berkes (2009) suggests that
comanagement has a number of different “faces,” several of
which, such as institution building and trust building, could be
considered mechanisms. In recent years, there has also been much
attention given to both network theory and the concept of social
capital in understanding the emergence and development of
comanagement (Plummer 2009). We draw on concepts from this
literature, in particular, bonding and bridging capital, to articulate
the workings of several of the mechanisms identified.  
During the formation of the scheme, a key factor stems from the
rules element of the framework, in which the group decided to
form a limited company to conduct its affairs. It is clear that
adopting a corporate strategy helped the group to overcome the
prevailing power dynamic and low levels of trust we identified in
the political economy and discourse studies by providing a
structure and an operating environment in keeping with the
business orientation of modern farming. Furthermore, the very
notion of a company appears to have cultural appeal to these
farmers, bonding them together through their mutual
understanding of and appreciation for it. It also gave the group
independent legal status, which greatly assisted with its successful
application for the shared water license. The adoption of the
shared license, which was not present in any of the other cases,
also appears to have triggered a bonding mechanism among group
members because, as with the decision to form a company,
introducing a shared license brought the farmers together and
encouraged collective decision making and action.  
Staying with the rules element of the framework, the formation
of a private company was accompanied by the drawing up of a
legally enforceable members’ agreement and protocol that detail
members’ rights, conduct, commitments, costs, and benefits, as
well as punitive measures for rule infringements. Doing this
embedded LWT within a macroinstitutional structure that
supports the group from both a legalistic and a regulatory
perspective, while still providing it with a degree of local
autonomy. The protocol also details an operating procedure for
internally allocating water among group members. On a general
level, the members’ agreement and protocol represents a case of
institution building at the local level (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997).
More specifically, however, we can observe that the specific system
of rules devised by the group serves to act both as a carrot and a
stick for its members. This is important given the structural
conditions we identified previously, which promote individualism,
competition, a drive to increase profits, and low levels of trust
among the farmers.  
On the one hand, the rules devised by the group act as a carrot
by giving members the opportunity to flexibly manage their water
allocation, thus increasing business profit and security. There are
also rules for fiscal equivalence, whereby the benefits accrued by
members are consistent with their financial contribution to the
workings of the scheme. This point would appear important to
these farmers because their strong business orientation infers they
are unlikely to want to spend more than they consider fair or to
concede any perceived competitive advantage to other members.
On the other hand, the rules, which are upheld by English law,
also act as a stick. In particular, serious rule infringements on the
part of members or a failure on the part of government officials
and others to respect the terms of the agreement can result in
action being taken in the courts. As can be seen in Table 2, this
“carrot-and-stick mechanism” (Fig. 6) is unique to the LWT case
study and appears to be crucial in explaining the emergence and
development of the comanagement arrangement.
Fig. 6. The carrot-and-stick mechanism.
From a biophysical perspective, the key factor to note is the
ponded system of drainage ditches that the group abstracts from,
which relates to the “stationarity” of the resource. Stationarity
refers to the mobility of a natural resource such as water, where
the less mobile the resource is, the more stationarity it has
(Schlager et al. 1994). As Ostrom et al. (1994:314) discuss,
stationarity is an important condition for developing collective
action because it “significantly affect[s] appropriators’ incentives
and capabilities to devise rules because of [its] impact on the type
of information available … [stationarity affects] the level of
reliable information and the costs of obtaining information.”
Stationarity was unique to the LWT case and can be considered
a key structural condition that facilitated the action of the various
comanagement mechanisms we detail. The ability of the group
to secure water over and above its existing allocation was also an
important factor because it represents a “plus-sum game,” which
is known to promote collaboration among water users (Dinar et
al. 1997). This access to additional water points to the last of three
mutually reinforcing bonding mechanisms, with the other two
having already been detailed previously.  
From the perspective of the community element of the
framework, commons theory suggests that the homogeneity of
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the farmers’ identities in terms of age, race, gender, and profession
would most likely have assisted group formation (Wade 1987,
Ostrom 1990, Baland and Platteau 1996). Another key
community factor was the presence of leadership within the
group, which took the form of a new farm business in the area
with a strong desire to secure additional water for irrigation. The
manager of this farm, incentivized by the success of his business,
functioned as an “energy center” (Pinkerton 1989b, Olsson et al.
2006) by leading discussions between the parties, bonding the
group together, and bridging it with local water managers, in turn
driving the scheme forward. The small size of the group is another
relevant structural condition that would appear to have facilitated
collective action. The LWT group is composed of 14 members, in
comparison with several of the other groups, the largest of which,
BAWAG, is composed of roughly 180 members and operates over
a much wider geographic area.  
The political-economic element of the framework draws attention
to the IDB’s relationship with the farmers and the EA. IDBs have
a long history dating back to the medieval period, in which for
much of this history they have shared a strong political and
economic alliance with farmers and landowners (Purseglove 1988,
Reeves and Williamson 2000). As a result, relatively high levels
of trust exist between the IDB and farmers, a factor that was
clearly of importance in the IDB’s decision to take responsibility
for administering the scheme. In the LWT case, it appears that
the group of farmers was able to take advantage of this historic
relationship to develop the scheme. In part, this is because the
owner of one of the farms in the scheme was also an IDB board
member.  
Furthermore, we found evidence that the IDB was also well
respected by the EA for its professionalism and technical know-
how. In this light, the IDB can be considered a “bridging
organization,” a role that is often crucial to comanagement
arrangements because of its importance in building trust and
social capital more generally, accessing and sharing knowledge,
and resolving conflicts (Berkes 2009). It may also be argued that
the LWT group itself  performs some of the functions of a bridging
organization within the scheme when seen in light of the
relationship between its members and local water managers.
Finally, with respect to the discourse element of the framework,
it was clear during our interviews that particularly local EA staff,
but also the farmers we spoke to, relied more on the compromise
repertoire than we found when analyzing all but one of the other
abstractor groups. The emergence of this repertoire reflects the
development of trust among the farmers in the group, in which
trust can be considered an emergent property that lowers
transaction costs and helps to facilitate cooperation (Folke 2003,
Olsson et al. 2004b).  
As our analysis makes clear, much of LWT’s involvement in
collective-choice situations has occurred during the scheme’s
formation, when the system of rules that guides the operational
activity of the group, the IDB, and the EA were put in place. This
process of institution building helped to overcome low levels of
trust while facilitating the emergence of power-sharing
arrangements. Over time, the various mechanisms we identified
previously, and in particular the carrot-and-stick mechanism,
appear to have facilitated problem solving and social learning
among group members in the face of change and uncertainty.
This was best illustrated when the group devised additional rules
to fund the eradication of the potato brown rot virus from the
drainage ditches that its members use for irrigation. The
procedure was institutionalized in the members’ protocol and
demonstrates that the company structure was able to cope with
an issue that was potentially divisive, given that some members
did not grow potatoes and so faced much less of an incentive to
expend resources treating the disease.  
Considering the outcomes of the LWT scheme, from a transaction
cost perspective it appears that information costs increase in some
respects and decrease in others. In general terms, information
costs go down as channels of communication open up between
farmers, and between farmers and water managers, where local
time-and-place knowledge is able to better complement the
scientific knowledge held by the regulator. However, information
costs also increase for farmers and the IDB with respect to the
weekly submission and processing of water usage data. This level
of communication is important not only in that it allows the IDB
to correctly manage water levels, but because it endows the
management system with greater sensitivity to both resource
conditions and farmer decision making, meaning it is better
prepared to deal with change when it occurs. Coordination costs
also increased, especially in the early development phase as the
group self-organized, legal costs for setting up the company were
incurred, and rules and operating procedures were devised. It
appears that these coordination costs are a significant factor in
the group members’ decision not to take the functionality of the
scheme any further, given the pressurized economic environment
that farmers are operating within, as well as their ideological
leaning toward individualism and competition. We also found
anecdotal evidence that an incentive for one or more group
members to drop out was because they knew they could benefit
from the additional water and better water level management that
the scheme provided while avoiding the costs of being a member.
This would represent a case of free riding, resulting in greater
strategic costs.  
Considering the overall evaluative criteria, we can conclude that
the LWT scheme has enhanced the adaptability of local water
governance in at least two ways. First, the establishment of new
networks and improved channels of communication between
farmers and water managers enhances the ability of the system
to respond to social-ecological feedback in a more timely and
flexible manner. Second, as demonstrated by the group’s ability
to deal with the case of potato brown rot virus, the organizational
and institutional structure of the scheme has helped to develop
greater social capital among participants and has facilitated their
ability to solve problems when they arise. It is very unlikely that
such an outcome to the threat of potato brown rot virus could
have been achieved without the presence of the group. Therefore,
despite a lack of interest in developing the scheme any further at
present, it does appear that the institutional structure of the group
and its relationship with the IDB and EA provide a latent capacity
for further action and adaptation. Figure 7 illustrates the
development of the various mechanisms we identify as they are
triggered over the life span of the LWT comanagement scheme,
in which the outcome is greater adaptive capacity at the local level.  
The scheme has also enhanced economic efficiency because it
allows specialist contract growers, an increasingly common
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feature of farming in England, more flexibility to rent land with
water to grow and irrigate their crops anywhere across the whole
land area of the group. This is a useful benefit considering the
long crop rotations required for disease control for some of these
crops. However, the scheme is unlikely to maximize economic
efficiency because of the noncompetitive nature of the group’s
water allocation system. This sharing system prohibits members
from bidding for water in such a way that, according to economic
theory, it would go to its highest value use (Keohane and Olmstead
2007). It is, however, possible to conceive of a similar scheme that
instead would adopt a competitive bidding system to allocate
water.
Fig. 7. The evolution of mechanisms throughout the life span
of the Lincoln Water Transfer Limited scheme.
From a water use perspective, the scheme also appears to be more
efficient than if  each farmer held an individual abstraction license
proportional to the farmer’s current share of the group’s joint
license. This was demonstrated when the group’s license came up
for renewal in 2010. At that time, several of the members handed
back some of their license share to the EA, resulting in a reduction
to the overall license volume. The reason given for this was that
these members felt confident that if  they needed additional water
they could apply for it within the group because of the added
security the scheme provides. This mind-set differs from the
standard situation in England, in which irrigators typically only
use approximately half  of their licensed volume but hold on to a
large amount of “headroom” for security. Finally, as noted
previously, the scheme demonstrated high levels of equity, in
terms of fiscal equivalence, with financial costs to members being
equivalent to the benefits they enjoyed in terms of license share.
Again, this dynamic was institutionalized in the members’
agreement and protocol.
THE FINDINGS IN THE WIDER CONTEXT
Of the factors of success and more abstract structural conditions
and generative mechanisms identified in Table 2, the following
will be taken further by considering their relevance in the context
of water resources management in England: (1a) the stationarity
of the resource; (1b) the formation of a limited company with a
clearly defined and legally binding members’ agreement and
protocol; (1c) the role of the IDB as a bridging organization and
scheme administrator; and (1d) a plus-sum game, in which the
farmers involved have the opportunity to acquire additional water
over and above their existing allocation.  
Looking to the future, we can also make several informed
inferences about changes to the exogenous variables of the
framework. These are as follows: (2a) the biophysical-material
world, for which water supply will become more variable and less
secure, with water scarcity becoming more common (EA 2012);
(2b) the rules-in-use, for which the regulatory system governing
water resources will continue along a direction of increasing
liberalization (DEFRA 2011, 2013b, EA/Ofwat 2011); and (2c)
the political economy and discourse domain, for which there will
be a continued drive toward both the use of economic instruments
for managing the environment and natural resources and as the
promotion of greater stakeholder participation and cooperation
(DEFRA 2011, 2013a, 2013b).  
How factors 1a-1d combine with inferences 2a-2c will be the
subject of this discussion. We will also reflect on what our
conclusions infer for comanagement in other countries with
similar characteristics to those we have outlined.  
Considering point 1a, the stationarity of the resource draws
attention to the benefits of developing water storage in
catchments where farmers currently abstract from nonstationary,
free-flowing rivers. This would make decisions about resource
allocation more predictable, in turn making it easier to devise
cooperative arrangements (Ostrom et al. 1994, Schlager et al.
1994) akin to the LWT model. Furthermore, there is scope for
enhancing the cooperative aspect of such an arrangement through
the development of joint reservoir schemes nested within larger
catchment-based abstractor groups. A small number of joint
reservoir schemes already exist in the east of England and have
allowed the farmers involved to devise their own operating
procedures and allocation rules. Interestingly, in one case the three
farm businesses have adopted the same shared strategy as LWT
by forming a limited company. This company separately owns the
reservoirs and related infrastructure, and the water is then sold
back to the individual members, who have a holding right
equivalent to their share of the business.  
There are large parts of eastern England that, like the LWT
scheme, are characterized by ponded networks of IDB-managed
drainage ditches with a high degree of stationarity (Fig. 1).
Furthermore, these regions tend to be prime agricultural land.
This suggests that there is much scope for encouraging the
emergence of water abstractor groups in these low-lying areas and
provides an opportunity for IDBs to take on a new function as a
bridging organization and administrator in a system of
comanagement (1c). In recent years, the place of the IDBs as they
currently exist has come under pressure from some angles
(Purseglove 1988, Bankoff 2013), and a move such as this one
might ensure their position within water management going
forward.  
It is also important to note that, particularly in the east of
England, roughly 50% of abstraction is from groundwater sources
(DEFRA 2015). Although water flow within aquifers is typically
less predictable and controllable than the flow in ponded surface
systems, here too there is potential for farmers to work together
to allocate the resource among themselves. In all these cases,
successful implementation of the scheme would be advanced by
the formation of a limited company or similar legal structure and
the adoption of a members’ agreement and protocol (1b). As we
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have discussed previously, doing so provides a familiar and
structured operating environment for farmers to work within and
a system of rules that can reward a farm business with greater
profit and business flexibility while formally penalizing rule
transgressions. This in turn helps to overcome the relatively low
levels of trust and a power dynamic that currently impedes the
participation of farmers in cooperative forms of water
governance.  
As climatic conditions change and irrigation needs and water
availability become more uncertain (2a), it is likely that these
options for enhancing cooperation between farmer groups and
water managers will become increasingly relevant if, as we suggest,
they are able to enhance the adaptability and efficiency of the
system. At the same time, as discussed previously, the possible
emergence of a more liberalized licensing system also has the
potential to change the relevance of these options from a
comanagement perspective (2b). If  we are to assume that the
government continues with its current proposals to further
develop a system of water rights trading in England, then in
contrast to the present system in which water users hold a license
that details a set quantity of water that may be abstracted, licenses
might instead become linked to the available flow in a given water
body. The volume of water linked to the license would therefore
go up and down as conditions in the river or aquifer change, and
some or all of the license could be traded with potential buyers.
Agriculture holds by far that greatest number of abstraction
licenses but only uses a small amount of water compared to the
public water supply (approximately 1.5% to 50%; DEFRA 2008).
This dynamic points toward a future scenario in which many small
trades occur between farmers, whereas less frequent but much
larger trades occur between water companies, or between water
companies and other sectors. Among other things, this has raised
the issue of market power, in which it is feared that large
abstractors, such as the water companies, will “outmuscle” the
smaller abstractors in a water market.  
This situation suggests that there is an opportunity to utilize the
strategy of pooling water licenses and forming a company among
a group of agricultural abstractors, in which doing so has the
potential to increase their standing in the market. Our analysis of
the other four case studies has already provided some evidence
that abstractor groups have a tendency to facilitate trading by
acting as a broker between buyers and sellers. By acting
collectively, each member’s license quantity would in effect serve
as a share in the company. Here, as with the LWT scheme, fiscal
equivalence could be achieved as member costs are incurred in
proportion to their company share. Furthermore, participating
in the market to secure additional water is a plus-sum game, which,
as noted, provides a greater incentive for farmers to work together
(1d). Having formed a company, members would have the option
to trade their individual licenses internally, submitting any
additional or unwanted water to a central pool, much like the
procedure used by the LWT group. Alternatively, this internal
allocation system could employ a competitive bidding/trading
process to maximize economic efficiency. However, we caution
that doing so has the potential to undermine other aspects of the
arrangement (Frey and Jegen 1999, Cardenas et al. 2000), such
as the development of social capital, in turn diminishing the
adaptability of the system. Any of the central pool that is not
taken up by members of the group may then be aggregated and
traded with other players in the market. A collective approach
such as this would have the advantage of providing flexibility of
water use within the agricultural sector, while giving farmers
greater security and a firmer standing in trading situations with
bigger players in the market.  
The UK government is currently only intending to develop water
markets in those catchments in which trading would bring
tangible benefits (DEFRA 2013b). In part, this is because
instituting a new regulatory system is a resource-intensive process.
This would suggest that, where possible, it would be better not to
implement such changes if  it can be avoided. Again, especially in
the IDB-controlled ponded systems to the east of the country
(Fig. 1), adopting schemes akin to the LWT model would save on
the need to undertake wholesale changes, while bringing the range
of potential benefits we identified. Developments of the sort
outlined in this discussion fit well with the changing political and
discursive landscape of environmental management in England,
where there is an increasing move toward both greater
participation and cooperation by all stakeholders in management
decision making and action, as well as management liberalization
through the adoption of economic measures such as water
markets or payment for ecosystem services (2c).  
It is probable that many of the findings that have made the LWT
model successful would apply in other countries with a similar
context. Generally speaking, these would be situations
characterized by a history of centralized natural resource
management, stakeholders embedded in capitalist systems of
production who are driven by strong economic incentives to act
individualistically and compete, and relationships lacking in trust.
Although structural conditions like stationarity and storage, and
mechanisms such as trust and a plus-sum game, are already
established criteria in the literature on the collective management
of natural resources (Ostrom et al. 1994, Dinar et al. 1997, Olsson
et al. 2004a, Plummer 2006), far less attention has been given to
institution building through the development of company
structures. However, the subject has not been wholly neglected.
For example, in a study of grazing systems in the Australian
Outback, Brunckhorst and Marshall (2007) consider the benefits
of developing a corporate approach among stakeholders as one
option for collectively managing the resource. The authors note
that “appropriate business structures might offer a supportive
framework for collective decisions that facilitate adaptive
management, [thus] enhancing sustainability and endurance”
(Brunckhorst and Marshall 2007:182). Our analysis of the LWT
scheme would support this assertion.
CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated the practical value of applying the
politicized IAD framework to studies of comanagement, through
an analysis of five farmer water abstractor groups in England. In
this case, the critical or politicized component of the analysis
assisted most in identifying the wider power dynamic that
conditions the behavior of irrigators in lowland England. The
research we have presented follows a previous submission to this
journal, in which we explored the relationship between the
politicized IAD framework and (adaptive) comanagement from
a theoretical perspective. By adopting an integrated and critical
approach, the analysis was able to identify a range of factors that
appear to link water abstractor groups in lowland England to a
comanagement outcome.  
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These factors of success were also used to infer more abstract
causal mechanisms and structural conditions that appeared to
generate or facilitate the emergence and development of
comanagement between abstractor groups and water managers.
Perhaps of most relevance to explaining this outcome was the
action of a carrot-and-stick mechanism, which relates to the
particular set of legally binding rules that the group devised. Other
mechanisms served to bond group members together and bridge
them with local water managers, and resource stationarity was
identified as the key structural condition facilitating the action of
the mechanisms we identified. We discussed the relevance of
several of our findings for English water governance in the future,
wherein the framework guided a set of predictions about likely
changes to the context in which water governance takes place. The
discussion considered the relationship between comanagement
and market theory by contemplating the place of water abstractor
groups within a more liberalized system of water trading, a topic
that has received scant attention in the literature to date.  
In general, our findings have relevance for the emergence of
comanagement in situations characterized by a power dynamic
that promotes individualistic and competitive behavior and in
which there has been a history of centralized and bureaucratic
natural resource governance. In particular, we have found
evidence that institution building through the adoption of a
company structure with a well-defined, legally enforceable
members’ agreement and protocol can help to overcome low levels
of trust among resource users and managers. Doing so has the
potential to facilitate power-sharing arrangements in a way that
enhances the adaptability of the system, while also maintaining
or even improving its efficiency and equity.  
The political economy and discourse analysis component of this
investigation highlighted the need to encourage collective action
among farmers through better integration of government
programs and the channeling of funding sources. To this extent,
we propose that the current system of grants and subsidies in
England should be used to promote the formation of new
catchment-based farmer groups, whose purpose is to comanage
water resources, while bringing existing groups into the
management fold. Funding for shared farm reservoirs could also
be used to increase resource stationarity in catchments while
creating a plus-sum game, with the intention of facilitating
collective action. Finally, we conclude by suggesting that further
investigations into the role of various types of company
structures, as a means of facilitating stakeholder cooperation and
participation in natural resource governance, would be of much
interest to scholars and practitioners of comanagement.
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